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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, s Case No. 
v. : Ct. App. No. 910132-CA 
DONALD L. JAEGER, t 
Defendant/Respondent. : Priority No. 13 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the court of appeals' summary dismissal of the 
State's appeal which challenged the magistrate's refusal to 
bindover and his dismissal of the information effectively deny 
the State any avenue for review of the magistrate's actions, a 
result in conflict with the State's historical right to seek 
review of a dismissed information and in conflict with the 
decisions of every jurisdiction which has addressed the issue? 
Did the court of appeals effectively decide an important issue of 
state law which has not, but should be, settled by this Court, 
that is: What is the appropriate method for review of a 
magistrate's order dismissing an information when refiling of the 
information is precluded under State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 
647 (Utah 1986)? 
2. Did the court of appeals erroneously conclude that 
State v, Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991), holding that a 
defendant is entitled to district court review of a bindover 
order, addressed and controlled the issue of the State's right to 
seek review of a refusal to bindover and dismissal of an 
information? 
3. Did the court of appeals' summary dismissal of the 
State's appeal fail to determine an important issue of state law 
which has not, but should be, settled by this Court, that is: 
Under the prima facie standard applicable to preliminary 
hearings, is probable cause established as a matter of law when 
the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the 
information, creates issues of fact and credibility to be 
resolved by a jury? 
4. Did the court of appeals' use of a per curiam 
unpublished summary disposition opinion to address the State's 
right to seek review of a magistrate's refusal to bindover and 
dismissal of an information, an issue of first impression under 
Utah's current statutory and rules scheme, "so far depart from 
the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings" as to call 
for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision? 
OPINION BELOW 
The court of appeals' opinion sought to be reviewed is 
State v. Donald L. Jaeger, No. 910132-CA (Utah App. January 7, 
1992), which amended the original opinion issued on January 3, 
1992 (copies of the opinions are attached to the addendum). 
JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
On January 3, 1992, the court of appeals issued its 
original unpublished opinion which summarily dismissed the 
State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. That opinion was 
2 
amended on January 7, 1992. A stay of remittitur was issued. 
The state was granted extension of time, up to and including 
March 17, 1992, in which to file the present petition. This 
Court has jurisdiction to consider the petition pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and 78-2a-4 (1992). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provisions, statutes and 
rules relied upon is set forth in the addendum to this petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann* § 76-5-203 
(1990) (R. 1). A preliminary hearing was held in Third Circuit 
Court, Salt Lake County, Utah (R. 17-19). The State's evidence 
established that defendant's live-in girlfriend, Mary Branch, 
died from a gunshot wound located in her left collar bone area 
(T. 37). Based on the location of the wound, the angle of 
trajectory of the bullet, the length of the victim's arms, and 
the type of weapon, the medical examiner testified that the wound 
could not have been self-inflicted (T. 47-66). The wound was 
inflicted from a gun which defendant maintained in the home for 
"his own safety" (T. 9, 11, 68). Defendant, the victim, and the 
victim's young child were the only persons in the home at the 
time of the shooting (T. 10, 67). GSR tests revealed no 
gunpowder residue on the victim's hands; defendant's hands 
contained substances "characteristic" of gunshot residue (T. 71-
3 
72, 89-90).2 At the close of the preliminary hearing, defendant 
moved to dismiss the information for lack of probable cause. The 
motion was taken under advisement (R. 19). 
On February 2, 1991, the magistrate issued a memorandum 
decision directing that the information be dismissed on the 
ground that the State had failed to establish sufficient probable 
cause to bindover defendant for trial (R. 20-38). On February 6, 
1991, the court issued an order discharging defendant and 
dismissing the information (R. 39). The State appealed (R. 44). 
The parties completed appellate briefing on November 
18, 1991. The issues raised were: 
(1) Must a magistrate, in determining 
probable cause for a bindover, view the 
evidence, including any reasonable 
inferences, in the light most favorable to 
the information; and, is probable cause 
established as a matter of law if the 
evidence, when so viewed, creates issues of 
fact and credibility to be resolved by a 
jury?; 
(2) Applying the proper standards of review, 
were the magistrate's factual findings 
clearly erroneous and his legal conclusion 
that no probable cause existed in error?; and 
(3) What is the proper avenue for review of 
a refusal to bindover and dismissal of an 
information when the refiling of the 
information is precluded under State v. 
Brickev, 714 P.2d 644 (Utah 1986)? 
Oral argument was set for January 23, 1992. 
On December 18, 1991, this Court issued its opinion in 
1
 The State's opening and reply briefs contained detailed 
statements of facts. Since an evaluation of that evidence is not 
necessary to determine if this petition should be granted, the 
facts are only briefly summarized here. 
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State v. Humphrey, 823 P. 2d 464 (Utah 1991), which reversed State 
v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah App. 1990). Since the parties 
had cited to the latter opinion in addressing defendant's 
jurisdictional argument, defendant immediately moved, with the 
stipulation of the State, for supplemental briefing to assess the 
"impact of the Utah Supreme Court decision" on the jurisdictional 
issue (Motion and Stipulation for Supplemental Briefing, dated 
December 20, 1991). The parties further stipulated that the 
scheduled oral argument should be stricken and reset to 
facilitate the necessary supplemental briefing. 
On January 3, 1992, the court of appeals summarily 
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The per curiam 
unpublished opinion contained no discussion of the issues raised 
except to conclude, without explanation, that Humphrey and rule 
12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandated district 
court review of a refusal to bindover and related dismissal of 
the information. State v. Jaeger, slip op. at 1-2. Based on 
this erroneous assumption, the court of appeals remanded the case 
to the district court. Id. at 2. Four days later, the court of 
appeals modified its decision by remanding the case to the 
circuit court. Jaeger, amended slip op. at 2. The opinion was 
otherwise unchanged. 
Because there presently exists no "new evidence or 
changed circumstances" to justify a refiling of the homicide 
information against defendant, the State is effectively precluded 
from seeking review, at any level, of the magistrate's refusal to 
5 
bindover and his dismissal of the information. As will be 
presented in the argument of this petition, this is a result 
found to be unacceptable by every jurisdiction which has 
addressed the issue. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BY SUMMARILY DISMISSING THE STATE'S APPEAL 
CHALLENGING THE MAGISTRATE'S REFUSAL TO 
BINDOVER AND DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION, 
THE COURT OF APPEALS EFFECTIVELY DENIED THE 
STATE ANY AVENUE OF REVIEW OF THE 
MAGISTRATE'S ACTIONS; THIS COURT SHOULD NOW 
DETERMINE WHAT IS THE APPROPRIATE METHOD OF 
REVIEW OF AN ORDER DISMISSING AN INFORMATION 
WHEN REFILING OF THE INFORMATION IS PRECLUDED 
BY STATE V. BRICKEY. 
The court of appeals' summary dismissal of the State's 
appeal which challenged the magistrate's refusal to bindover 
defendant and his dismissal of the information has effectively 
precluded any review of the magistrate's actions in this case. 
The court of appeals has denied appellate review; district court 
review is not procedurally available since no bindover order was 
issued; and the information may not be refiled in circuit court 
due to the limitations of State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 647 
(Utah 1986).2 Unless certiorari is granted, the magistrate's 
erroneous ruling that no probable cause exists in support of the 
information will remain insulated from judicial correction. This 
is a result not contemplated by the legislature nor sanctioned by 
2
 Once dismissed, an information may only be refiled if the 
prosecutor establishes that "new or previously unavailable 
evidence has surfaced or that other good cause justifies 
refiling." State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d at 647. 
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any other jurisdiction which has addressed the issue. 
While the State's right to appeal is restricted by 
statute, State v. Kelbach, 569 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Utah 1977), Utah 
prosecutors have consistently been provided with some method of 
review of dismissed informations in criminal cases. United 
States v. Eldredae, 13 P. 673 (Utah), cert, denied, 145 U.S. 636 
(1887) (recognizing territorial government's right to appeal from 
demurred information); State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah 
App. 1990) (discussing state's traditional right to appeal from a 
quashed information and the statutory expansion to include any 
final judgment of dismissal); Utah Code Ann. § 77-39r4(l) (1978) 
(permitting the state to directly appeal from a "judgment of 
dismissal in favor of the defendant upon a motion to quash the 
information or indictment"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26(c)(1) 
(1980) (permitting the state to directly appeal from any "final 
judgment of dismissal"); Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(2)(a) (Supp. 
1991) (permitting the state to directly appeal from a "final 
judgment of dismissal"); and Rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (allowing unrestricted refiling of dismissed 
informations). 
Prior to 1980, the State was permitted to directly 
appeal "a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant upon a 
motion to quash or dismiss the information." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-39-4. This review was never defined as being restricted to 
district court orders. However, as a practical matter, it was so 
restricted because an information could only be filed in district 
7 
court after a magistrate had found probable cause to justify 
holding a defendant on the initial complaint.3 
In 1980, Utah adopted a procedure whereby charges were 
initiated by information. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(3) (1980). 
With this change, rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, was 
amended to enlarge the powers of the magistrates beyond 
discharging a defendant to include dismissal of the information. 
Contemporaneously, the State was given express and unrestricted 
authority to refile an information dismissed by a magistrate. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(d)(1) (1980). The State's right to appeal was 
also expanded beyond the traditional concept of appealing from a 
quashed information to now include the right to appeal from any 
"final judgment of dismissal." Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-26. 
Accord State v. Amador, 804 P.2d at 1235. 
With the creation of the Utah Court of Appeals, the 
rules governing the State's right to appeal or to refile a 
dismissed information remained substantively the same, while new 
rules emerged to differentiate the jurisdictions of the appellate 
courts. Utah R. Crim. P. 7(8)(c) (1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-
18a-l(2) (Supp. 1991). The court of appeals was granted 
appellate jurisdiction over "appeals from the circuit courts," 
3
 Until 1980, criminal charges in Utah were initiated by 
complaint. Under this system, a magistrate simply discharged the 
defendant if no probable cause was found to support a bindover. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-7 (1978). If probable cause was found, 
the defendant was ordered "held to answer to the same." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-15-9(1) (1978). Prosecution could then proceed in 
district court on an information. Utah Code Ann. § 77-10-3 
(1978). 
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while this Court retained jurisdiction over appeals from "orders, 
judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction." 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-2(3)(j) and 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1991). 
From these changes, the current issue emerges. Are 
magistrates acting in their traditional non-adjudicative function 
when they dismiss informations; or, have their powers been 
expanded to those of an adjudicator in quashing an information? 
If the latter, should such orders be viewed as magistrate's 
orders or as orders of the court of record from which they issue? 
Further, if appellate review is not appropriate, under what 
circumstances, is the State entitled to seek review? While 
these issues may be raised in light of dicta in State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 465, 467-68 (Utah 1991), that a magistrate's 
order is not equivalent to a final judgment of a court of record, 
this Court has not directly determined the scope or nature of the 
State's right to seek review of a magistrate's order of 
dismissal.4 (See Point II, for discussion of the scope of the 
Humphrey decision.) 
Critical to the ultimate determination of the State's 
right, is the issue of the impact of Brickey on a magistrate's 
4
 The State recognizes the complexity of determining the 
nature and scope of the State's right to seek in review in light 
of Utah's current statutory and rule scheme, the legislative 
intent behind any conflicting provisions, and the proper judicial 
characterization of magistrates. This petition does not attempt 
to fully present or resolve these issues, but is limited to 
demonstrating why this unsettled question should be determined by 
this Court. 
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refusal to bindover: Does Brickey convert what might otherwise 
be considered an interim order into a final judgment of 
dismissal? Do the due process limitations of Brickev nullify the 
judicial review contemplated by rule 7, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, such that some other method of review is necessary to 
preserve the State's historical right to seek correction of an 
erroneously dismissed information? As noted by at least one 
commentator, to refuse to provide appellate review because of 
lack of "finality" of a judgment, which judgment fully precludes 
the State from proceeding, amounts to the "awkward and 
unjustified setoff of two irrational rules," Graham and Letwin, 
"The Preliminary Hearing in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and 
Legal Policy Observations," 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 635, 731 (1971). 
Indeed, every jurisdiction which has addressed the 
prosecution's right to seek review of a refusal to bindover and 
dismissal of an information has considered the presence or 
absence of a Brickey-type restriction. State v. Fry, 385 N.W.2d 
196, 198-99 (Wis. App. 1985) (where refiling is subject to a 
Brickev-type standard, the state retains the right to appeal 
erroneous legal conclusion); State v. Antes. 246 N.W.2d 671, 674 
(Wis. 1976) (when prosecution is restricted from refiling under 
Brickey-type standard, any dismissal of the charges is a final 
order and appealable); Commonwealth v. Finn, 496 A.2d 1254, 1255 
(Pa. Sup. 1985) (while a dismissal of an information for lack of 
probable cause is not ordinarily considered a final order since 
the prosecution may freely refile, it will be considered as final 
10 
and appealable where refiling is precluded due to a statute of 
limitations); Commonwealth v. Prado, 393 A.2d 8, 10 (Penn. 1978) 
(a dismissal of an information for lack of probable cause will be 
considered final where lower court had refused to allow 
refiling); Walker v. Schneider, 477 N.W.2d 167, 171-75 (N.D. 
1991) (under its writ and rulemaking powers, the court adopts a 
Brickev standard and then construes the dismissal of information 
as a final order which may be appealed); State Ex Rel. Fallis v. 
Caldwell, 498 P.2d 426, 428 (Okl. App. 1972) (using its writ 
powers, the court adopts a prospective rule that the prosecution 
is entitled to a right of review of a dismissed information co-
equal with that of defendant's right to review of bindover 
order); State v. Zimmerman, 660 P.2d 960, 963-64 (Kan. 1983) 
(where refiling is restricted, dismissal of a criminal complaint 
is equivalent to a final order; statue permits appeals from such 
orders and is not effected by the possibility that the State may 
refile); Morgan v. State, 675 P.2d 473 (Okl. App. 1984) (State's 
right to refile or appeal from dismissal are alternative modes of 
procedure); People v. Nevitt, 256 N.W.2d 612 (Mich. App. 1977) 
(where charges are dismissed, better practice is to allow appeal 
rather than permit de novo refiling); State v. Ruiz, 678 P.2d 
1109, 1110 (Idaho 1984) (where no Brickey-type restriction on 
refiling, the State's remedy for a dismissed information is to 
refile de novo before a different magistrate); State v. Fahev, 
275 N.W.2d 870, 871 (S.D. 1979) (magistrate's order of dismissal 
is not final order where State has unrestricted right to refile 
11 
811 (Minn. 1971) (State's right to review of dismissed charges is 
limited to its unrestricted right to refile the charges de novo 
before a different magistrate). See also People v. Mimms, 204 
Cal.App.3d 471f 251 Cal.Rptr. 672 (Cal. App. 1988) (recognizing 
appellate courts attempts to provide review to state of 
magistrate's order and subsequent legislative reform allowing the 
prosecution to first seek reconsideration from the magistrate who 
dismisses an information and then permitting direct appellate 
review of the magistrate's refusal to reconsider); 
The determination of the nature and scope of the 
State's right to seek review of a magistrate's refusal to 
bindover and dismissal of the information presents an important 
question of state law which has not, but should be, settled by 
this Court. Utah R. App. P. 46(d). Even when other 
jurisdictions have found no direct appellate jurisdiction, the 
courts have utilized their inherent writ and rulemaking powers to 
resolve the issue. People v. District Court, 803 P.2d 193 (Colo. 
1990) (writ power of supreme court may be used to show cause why 
charges should not be reinstated); Commonwealth v. Prado, 393 
A.2d at 10 (appeal review is appropriate where no other judicial 
review is available). Similarly, this Court should grant 
certiorari to determine this question which is of significance to 
both the prosecution and defense. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED 
THAT STATE V, HUMPHREY RULED ON THE SCOPE AND 
NATURE OF THE STATE'S RIGHT TO SEEK REVIEW OF 
A REFUSAL TO BINDOVER AND DISMISSAL OF AN 
INFORMATION. 
In summarily dismissing the State's appeal, the court 
of appeals erroneously concluded that State v. Humphrey, 823 P.2d 
at 464, both addressed and determined the nature of the State's 
right to seek review of a magistrate's refusal to bindover and 
dismissal of an information. The court of appeals' overly broad 
reading of Humphrey to mandate dismissal of this case is in 
conflict with the expressed limited holding of Humphrey and 
effectively determines, without analysis, an issue of state law 
which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court. Utah 
R. App. P. 46(c), 46(d). 
The only issue in Humphrey was "whether, in light of 
recent statutory and constitutional changes associated with the 
creation of the Utah Court of Appeals, the district courts no 
longer have jurisdiction to quash bindover orders." Humphrey, 
823 P.2d at 465. In holding that the district courts had 
inherently retained such jurisdiction, this Court expressly 
reserved the question of whether a quashal of a bindover order is 
equivalent to a dismissal of an information and failed to 
otherwise directly consider the ramifications of a quashed or 
dismissed information. This Court held only that when a 
defendant is bound over to district court, "the district court's 
authority to review defective informations includes the authority 
13 
to review defective bindover orders•M JEd. at 466, n.3. 
While the court of appeals correctly recited this 
limited holding, the court failed to otherwise offer any basis 
for its conclusion that Humphrey compelled the dismissal of this 
case. By expanding Humphrey's narrow holding without analysis or 
explanation, the court of appeals rendered an opinion which is 
implicitly in conflict with this Court's acknowledgment of its 
own limited ruling. 
Assuming arguendo that the court of appeals found some 
other basis in Humphrey for its decision, the court failed to 
offer any indication of its reasoning. While this Court's dicta 
in Humphrey may raise arguable issues when applied to the State's 
right to judicial review of a magistrate's actions, those issues 
are not capable of being summarily decided. State v. Gardiner, 
814 P.2d 568, 572 (Utah 1991) (dicta has no precedent value and 
is not controlling). Accord Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 468 (earlier 
dicta is not controlling). 
Yet, the court of appeals, with only perfunctory 
consideration of Humphrey, simply assumed that the State's right 
to review was identical to that of the defendant. While this 
Court may ultimately incorporate the dicta in Humphrey to limit 
the State's right to seek appellate review of a refusal to 
bindover and dismissal of an information, the issue is 
significant and deserves thoughtful analysis in a published 
opinion. In this manner, proper consideration would be given to 
the State's historical right to judicial review of dismissed 
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and/or quashed informations, the impact of any rule and statutory 
modifications on that right, the legislative intent behind any 
presently conflicting statutory provisions, and the significant 
variances between the procedure governing a bindover which 
invokes jurisdiction and a refusal to bindover which effectively 
revokes jurisdiction. 
Unless this Court accepts certiorari, this important 
question of state law will remain unresolved* Utah R. App, P. 
46(d). For while the State has been denied any right to seek 
review of the magistrate's actions in this case, the unpublished 
ruling provides no precedent value to future litigants. 
POINT III 
IN ADDITION TO THE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE, THIS 
CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT ISSUE OF STATE LAW 
WHICH HAS NOT, BUT SHOULD BE, SETTLED BY THIS 
COURT, THAT IS: IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
BINDOVER ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN 
THE EVIDENCE, VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE INFORMATION, CREATES ISSUES 
OF FACT AND CREDIBILITY TO BE RESOLVED BY A 
JURY? 
Because the court of appeals summarily dismissed the 
State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, the court never 
addressed the substantive issues raised by the parties, that is: 
Under the prima facie standard applicable to preliminary 
hearings, must the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable 
to supporting the information; and, when so viewed, is the 
evidence sufficient to establish probable cause, as a matter of 
law, when it creates issues of fact and credibility to be 
resolved by a jury? While it is firmly established that the 
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evidence at a preliminary hearing must "establish a prima facie 
case against the defendant from which the trier of fact could 
conclude the defendant was guilty of the offense charged," State 
v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980), no Utah case has 
ruled on the specific parameters of how a magistrate should 
evaluate the evidence to determine if a prima facie case has been 
established. 
It is clear that for trial purposes, courts should not 
weigh conflicting evidence in addressing the appropriateness of 
dismissals based on insufficient evidence and directed verdicts. 
Rather, the court must consider the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party 
against whom the motion is directed and 
resolve controverted facts in his favor. If 
the evidence and its inferences would cause 
reasonable men to arrive at different 
conclusions as to whether the essential facts 
were or were not proved, then the question is 
one of fact for the jury. Unless the 
evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inference to prove some issue 
which supports the plaintiff's claim, a court 
should not direct a verdict for the 
defendant. 
Cruz v. Montova, 660 P.2d 723, 728-29 (Utah 1983) (citations 
omitted). 
Following this same standard, other jurisdictions have 
concluded that under the prima facie/directed verdict standard,5 
a preliminary hearing court is mandated to view the evidence, and 
all reasonable inferences, in the light most favorable to the 
5
 In the preliminary hearing context, these terms are 
treated synonymously. LaFave and Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 
14.3(a). 
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prosecution, and then determine if some evidence exists in 
support of all requisite elements of the crime. If credible 
evidence exists both supporting and negating an element, this 
presents a question of fact to be resolved by the jury and a 
bindover is required. People v. Superior Court (KneipU 268 
Cal.Rptr. 1, 3 (Cal. Ct. App. 6 Dist. 1990); People v. Superior 
Court fBouldenK 257 Cal.Rptr. 678, 680 (Calif. Ct. App. 1st 
Dist. 1989); People v. District Court, 803 P.2d 193, 196 (Colo. 
1990); People v. Garner, 781 P.2d 87, 90 (Colo. 1989); People v. 
Pedrie, 727 P.2d 859, 862 (Colo. 1986); State v. Patterson, 570 
A.2d 174, 179 (Conn. 1990) People v. Moore, 446 N.W.2d 834, 838 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989), appeal denied Mich. (1990); Matter 
of Buckner, 284 N.W.2d 507, 509 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979); State ex 
rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 N.W.2d 458, 461 (Wis. 1982). 
The determination of the proper standard to be applied 
in evaluating the evidence at a preliminary hearing also requires 
definition of the magistrate's role in considering credibility. 
While this Court in State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d at 786, gave 
tacit approval to a committing magistrate making some initial 
determinations of credibility, it did not address the issue of 
how such a requirement blends with the recognition that a 
preliminary hearing cannot determine ultimate issues of 
culpability. Other courts have concluded that "a judge in a 
preliminary hearing has jurisdiction to consider the credibility 
of witnesses only when, as a matter of law, the testimony is 
implausible or incredible." Hunter v. District Court, 543 P.2d 
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1265, 1268 (Colo. 1975). Accord People in Interest of M.V., 742 
P.2d 326, 329 (Colo. 1987); Matter of Buckner, 284 N.W.2d at 509; 
State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 317 N.W.2d at 461. 
If certiorari review is permitted on the jurisdictional 
question, review should also be granted on this substantive issue 
which has not, but should be, decided by this Court. Utah R. 
App. P. 46(d). Regardless of the type of review permissible from 
a magistrate's order, the bar and trial bench would benefit from 
this Court's direction as to how evidence in support of probable 
cause should be evaluated. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT OF APPEALS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE 
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT SUMMARILY DISMISSED THE 
STATE'S APPEAL THAT THIS COURT SHOULD 
EXERCISE ITS POWER OF SUPERVISION BY 
ACCEPTING REVIEW OF THE MATTER. 
As discussed, this appeal presented two issues of first 
impression in Utah. First, what method of review is appropriate 
for an order of dismissal of an information where no refiling of 
the information would be permitted under State v. Brickev? 
Second, under the prima facie standard, is probable cause 
established as a matter of law when the evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the information, creates issue of fact 
and credibility to be resolved by a jury? Both parties 
diligently briefed these issues; neither party argued that any 
Utah case had directly resolved the issues. 
Despite this, the court of appeals, without notice to 
the parties that it was considering summary disposition, issued 
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its unpublished per curiam opinion dismissing the appeal. The 
court then struck oral argument and ruled that the issue of 
supplemental briefing was "moot." Jaeger, amended slip op. at 2. 
Four days later, the court issued its amended opinion. 
While the court of appeals has the inherent right to 
dispose of any case before it without full briefing and without 
oral argument, it is clear that rule 10, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, contemplates that summary reversal of a case should 
only be invoked when the parties have had an opportunity to 
respond to such a drastic procedure. (See Utah R. App. P. 10(a)-
(c), requiring notice and an opportunity to respond w£en a party 
moves for summary disposition and allowing reversal only for 
manifest error.) 
Nor can the implications of rule 10 be ignored because 
this appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. In the case 
of most dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, the issue is 
determined by a simple review of the record. Yet, even in those 
cases, the practice of the court of appeals is to give notice 
that summary disposition is being considered and then to grant 
the parties an opportunity to respond. Just as this Court 
recognized in issuing a reasoned published opinion in Humphrey, 
even when a court finds that it does not have jurisdiction, that 
determination, when one of first impression, deserves full 
appellate consideration due to its severe ramifications. Accord 
State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d at 570, n.l. 
In failing to permit the parties an opportunity to 
fully brief the jurisdictional issue in light of intervening case 
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without notice or opportunity for the parties to respond, and in 
issuing an unpublished per curiam opinion to decide an issue of 
first impression, the court of appeals substantially departed 
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. This 
Court should exercise its power of supervision and grant 
certiorari to review the appropriateness of the court of appeals' 
actions. Utah R. App. P. 46(c). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully 
requests that this Court grant the petition for writ of 
certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /T^day of March, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Gener^l^^ 
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing petition for writ of certiorari was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Joan C. Watt, attorney for respondent, Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, this of March,^1992. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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JAN 71992 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Donald L. Jaeger, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
T
- Nocnan 
Q*^e Court 
AMENDED* 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910132-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 7, 1992) 
Third Circuit, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable Michael L. Hutchings 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltisf Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Joan C. Watt, Lisa J. Remal, and Richard P. Mauro, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Russon, Bench, and Greenwood (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on appellee's motion and 
stipulation for supplemental briefing and to strike oral 
argument. 
Defendant was charged with second degree murder and a 
preliminary hearing was held. The court dismissed the 
information on the ground that the State failed to establish 
probable cause to bind over defendant to district court for 
trial. The State appeals. 
In State v. Humphrey. No. 900434 (Utah December 18, 1991), 
the Utah Supreme Court held that jurisdiction to review bindover 
orders rests with the district court, not with the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The court stated that when a bindover order is issued, 
the circuit court judge, acting as a magistrate, determines 
whether there is sufficient evidence to bind defendant over for 
trial. If so, the information is then transferred to the 
*This replaces the memorandum decision issued on January 3, 1992. 
district court permitting that court to take original 
jurisdiction of the matter- The district court then "has the 
inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its 
original jurisdiction has been properly invoked." .Id. Further, 
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure gives the 
district courts authority to review defects in the indictment or 
information. 
In this case, the State appeals from the circuit court's 
dismissal of an information, alleging defendant should have been 
bound over to district court for trial. In accordance with 
Humphrey. we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and 
remand to the circuit court. Because we dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction, oral argument is stricken and the motion 
for supplemental briefing is deemed moot. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
Russel^-W. Bench, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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CURRENT PROVISIONS 
Rule 7. Proceedings before magistrate. 
(8) (a) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws 
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden 
of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and 
present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine the witnesses 
against him. 
(b) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe 
that the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has 
committed it, the magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be 
bound over to answer in the district court. The findings of probable cause 
may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to evidence on 
the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly 
raised at the preliminary examination. 
(c) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, 
the magistrate shall dismiss the informatior and discharge the defen-
dant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and 
an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do not preclude the 
state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. 
77-18a-l. Appeals — When proper. 
(1) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea; 
(b) an order made after judgment that affects the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(c) an interlocutory order when upon petition for review the appellate 
court decides the appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a mental 
disease or defect incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecution. 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution from: 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal; 
(b) an order arresting judgment; 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of double 
jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part of it invalid; 
(e) an order of the court granting a pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence when upon a petition for review the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(f) an order of the court granting a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty 
or no contest. 
1980 PROVISIONS 
77-1-3. Definitions—Peace officer classifications.—For the purpose of 
this act: . , 
(1) "Criminal action" means the proceedings by which a person is charged, 
accused and brought to trial for a public offense; 
(2) "Indictment" means an accusation, in writing, presented by a grand 
jury to the district court, charging a person with a public offense; 
(3) "Information" means an accusation, in writing, charging a person with a 
public offense which is presented and signed by a prosecuting attorney and 
filed in the office of the clerk where the prosecution is commenced or sub-
scribed and sworn to by a complaining witness before a magistrate if the 
offense is a class B misdemeanor or a lesser offense not requiring approval of 
the prosecuting attorney; 
77-35-26, Rule 26—Appeals.—(a) An appeal is taken by filing with the 
clerk of the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of appeal stating the 
order or judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the 
adverse party or his attorney of record. Proof of service of such copy shall be 
filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may be taken by the defendant: 
(1) From the final judgment of conviction; 
(2) From an order made, after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of 
the defendant; 
(3) From an interlocutory order when, upon petition for review, the su-
preme court decides that such an appeal would be in the interest of justice; or 
(4) From any order of the court judging the defendant by reason of a men-
tal disease or defect, incompetent to proceed further in a pending prosecu-
tion. 
(c) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution: 
(1) From a final judgment of dismissal; 
(2) From an order arresting judgment; 
(3) From an order terminating the prosecution because of a finding of dou-
ble jeopardy or denial of a speedy trial; 
(4) From a judgment of the court holding a statute or any part thereof 
invalid; or 
(5) From an order of the court granting a pre-trial motion to suppress evi-
dence when, upon a petition for review, the supreme court decides that such 
an appeal would be in the interest of justice. 
1980 PROVISIONS 
77-35-7. Rule 7—Proceeding v*fore magistrate. 
(c) If a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on to plead 
before the committing magistrate. During the initial appearance before the 
magistrate, the defendant shall be advised of his right to a preliminary exam-
ination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary examination, and 
the prosecuting attorney consent . the magistrate shall forthwith order the 
defendant bound over to answer L* the district court. If the defendant does 
not waive a preliminary examination, the magistrate shall schedule the pre-
liminary examination. Such examination shall be held within a reasonable 
time, but in any event not later than ten days if the defendant is in custody 
for the offense charged and not later than 30 days if Ke is not in custody; 
provided, however, that these time periods may be extended by the magis-
trate for good cause shown. A preliminary examination shall not be held if the 
defendant is indicted. 
(d) (1) A preliminary examination shall be held in accordance with the 
rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state 
shall have the burden of proof and be required to proceed first with its case. 
At the conclusion of the state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, 
call witnesses, and present evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine 
the witnesses against him. If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable 
cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed and that the 
defendant has committed it, the magistrate shall forthwith order, in writing, 
that the defendant be bound over to answer in the district court. The findings 
of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part. Objections to 
evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are not prop-
erly raised at the preliminary examination. If the magistrate does not find 
probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been committed or that 
the defendant committed it, the magistrate shall dismiss the information and 
discharge the defendant. The magistrate may enter findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge shall not 
preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same 
offense. 
1978 PROVISIONS 
77-10-3. 'Information" defined.—An information is an accusation in 
writing in form and substance like an indictment for the same offense, charg-
ing a person with a public offense, presented and signed by the district at-
torney, or by the attorney pro tempore for the state, and filed in the office 
of the clerk of the district court. 
77-15-7. Form of commitment.—The commitment for examination shall 
be made by an indorsement, signed by the magistrate on the warrant of 
arrest, to the following effect. "The within named A B, having been 
brought before me under this warrant is committed for examination to 
the sheriff of — " If the sheriff is not present, the defendant may 
be committed to the custody of any peace officer. 
77-15-9. Procedure on preliminary examination.—At the examination 
the magistrate must first read to the defendant the complaint and the 
depositions of the witnesses examined or making the complaint, if depo-
sitions were taken. 
77-39-4. Appeal by state, in what cases.—An appeal may be taken 
by the state: 
(1) From a judgment of dismissal in favor of the defendant upon 
a motion to quash the information or indictment. 
(2) From an order arresting judgment. 
(3) From an order made after judgment affecting the substantial 
rights of the state. 
(4) From an order of the court directing the jury to find for the 
defendant. 
